Friday, June 28, 2013

PE Suffers From Lack of Deal Flow

Private Equity Suffers From Lack of Deal Flow

by Terry Stidham, President of Target Search Group

LBOs in the US declined in Q2  to the lowest quarterly value of fresh deals in more than three years after an aggressive start to the year, according to data by Mergermarket. This keeps the question alive of where we are in the market’s recovery since the start of the financial crisis.

Leveraged buyouts totaled $41.9bn in the quarter, the lowest since Q1 of 2010, when they reached $33.3bn. The drop is more dramatic in number of deals, which fell to 293, the lowest total since Q1 of 2003. In the US the volumes decreased 67 per cent.

While PE groups have had inadequate deal flow, they have exploited renewed appetite from trade buyers to sell investments.
 


Private equity-backed exits rebounded 78 per cent in Q2 to $61.6b, compared with the first quarter. There were 310 in total. However, exits were down 39 per cent from the second quarter of last year.

Secondary buyout exits more than tripled to $25b in Q2 from a three-and-a-half year low in Q1.

Given the growing backlog of private equity exits, bankers are hopeful that the rest of the year will remain active. However, recent market turmoil after Ben Bernanke signaled the end of his stimulus program adds an air of uncertainty.

“Risk is clearly being re-priced and we’re in adjustment phase,” said Matthew Grinnell, managing director in charge of financial sponsors coverage at Barclays. He feels that this might make it harder for private equity bidders to meet sellers’ price expectations.

Rising equity markets and cash-rich corporations are making it difficult to buy and much easier to sell, Leon Black, Apollo's CEO said. “We are more of a net seller today,” he said. “It’s almost biblical: there’s a time to reap and there’s a time to sow. We are harvesting now.”

So far this year, Apollo has reached a deal to sell its majority-owned Metals USA Holdings for $770.7 million to India’s Reliance Steel, as well as stakes it held in Charter Communications and SourceHOV.

TPG‘s co-founder David Bonderman only half-agrees with Black.  He says, “It’s a good time to be a seller but it’s not a terrible time to be a buyer,” because of the cheap financing.

If you need help sourcing targeted opportunities contact the deal flow specialists at Target Search Group today to discuss your needs.


About: Terry Stidham, President and Founder of Target Search Group (TSG). TSG is a business development firm providing focused deal flow and investment opportunities in the lower to middle markets exclusively on the buy-side for a select number of private equity and corporate clients. TSG sources and originates investment opportunities that fit their client's strategy, size and focus on a generalist, opportunistic, and a specific search basis. 

Terry is a Business Development Leader with extensive knowledge of the M&A process, combined with an in-depth understanding of the constantly changing global capital markets environment. He has served as the head of entrepreneurial organizations as well as Fortune 500 companies. He specializes with mid-market companies in a diverse array of industry sectors from service and manufacturing to technical and professional firms.

Mr. Stidham speaks the language of both the seller and the buyer having vast experience on both sides of the transaction. He has been directly involved in the execution and successful closing of hundreds of investment banking and corporate finance transactions. Mr. Stidham has instructed thousands of business owners on how to prepare for a successful exit. He improves operational efficiencies leading to significant increased value.





Sunday, June 16, 2013

Understanding LBOs

Leveraged Buyouts

by Terry Stidham, President of Target Search Group


Wall Street has proven Archimedes' statement, "Give me a lever long enough and a place to stand, and I will move the earth" to be true through their use of Leveraged Buyouts. 

A Leveraged Buyout ("LBO"), is achieved by a Financial Sponsor acquiring a controlling interest in a company by financing a large percentage of the purchase price through leveraged borrowing. The buyer may be the current management, the employees or a private equity firm. The assets of the acquired company are used as collateral for the borrowed capital, sometimes with assets of the acquiring company. Leveraged buyouts use a combination of various debt instruments from bank and debt capital markets. The bonds or other paper issued for leveraged buyouts are commonly considered not to be investment grade because of the risks involved. Some leveraged buyouts occur in companies experiencing hard times and potentially facing bankruptcy, or they may be part of an overall plan.


Source Wikipedia
The concept of the process is not complex, and, if used correctly, can lead to a successful future for a company that may be at risk or crisis. 

Companies of all sizes and industries have been the target of leveraged buyout transactions, although because of the importance of debt and the ability of the acquired firm to make regular loan payments after the completion of a leveraged buyout, some features of potential target firms make for more attractive leverage buyout candidates, including:
  • Low existing debt loads
  • Historical financials that reflect stable and recurring cash flows
  • Market conditions and perceptions that depress the valuation or stock price
  • The potential for new management to make operational or other improvements to the firm to boost cash flows
  • Hard assets (property, plant and equipment, inventory, receivables) that may be used as collateral for lower cost secured debt
  • 
    Contact Us for Your Business Development, Deal Flow & Sourcing Needs
While some LBOs can lead to large layoffs and asset selloffs, some LBOs can be part of a long-term plan to save a company through leveraged acquisitions. Empirical evidence shows that many LBOs, like other types of buyouts, have resulted in significant improvements in firms’ performance (using a range of indicators from cash flow to return on investment), which can be explained by a combination of factors including tax benefits, strengthened management, internal reorganization, and change in corporate culture. 

On the other hand, LBOs, because of the leverage aspect, are controversial because they may cause disruptions and economic hardship in the company purchased: Its assets serve as collateral for the borrowed money, the purchasing company (often a holding company whose only purpose is corporate ownership and control) intending to repay the loan by using the future profits and cash flows from the purchased company or, failing that, by selling its assets (i.e., dismantling the company). 

LBOs have raised issues of ethics, notably about conflicts of interest between managers or acquirers and shareholders, insider trading, stockholders’ welfare, excessive fees to intermediaries, and squeeze-outs of minority shareholders (who may well receive a good price for their shares, an average of 30% to 40% more than the market price, but do not eventually benefit from the massive financial rewards of shrewd post buyout strategies).

Challenges and Demand for LBOs

Although LBOs still have the largest amount of funds available for investments the private equity industry has experienced some decline in their capacity for leveraged buyouts due to external pressures and investor preferences.

Top 7 Reasons for Trend 
 
  1. Monetizing portfolio companies are talking longer in recent years. That traps investors' capital, reducing capacity for redeployment in new funds or in some cases for recycling existing funds.  
  2. Newly launched buyout funds - even from established managers - are having an increasingly difficult time raising the same amounts of capital they did in earlier funds. Large institutional investors have been cautious on private equity due to liquidity constraints they encountered in 2008 as well as poor return expectations for the whole sector. 
  3. Many pensions and endowments are staying away from some of the mega-funds with the belief they are too bulky to achieve superior returns. And in cases where major investors do come into large LBO funds, they often demand to directly co-invest with these funds on buyout deals. These co-investments, on which pensions do not pay fees, become a significant portion of investors' private equity allocations. Pension holding company shares directly on their books limit the amount of capital available for LBO funds. Some years back when deals were too large for a single fund, LBO firms would call each other to club on transactions. Now they call their investors to present co-investment opportunities. 
  4. Companies have developed preventive strategies and defensive tactics (with “poison pills” meant to deter hostile bids, typically giving current shareholders particular rights to buy additional shares or to sell shares with severe economic penalties on the LBO acquirer).  
  5. Changes in legislation make such takeovers more difficult (e.g., with Delaware’s merger moratorium law or Ohio’s control share acquisition law).
  6. The rise of litigation against leveraged bids (for instance with allegations of violations of antitrust and securities laws) contribute to the difficulties in completing a LBO.
  7. Ongoing re-balancing in retirement funding. Increasingly employers are shifting from defined benefits to defined contribution pensions. Defined contribution accounts are managed by individuals rather than pension funds and do not have access to alternative investments such as private equity. The slower growth in defined benefits accounts (as well as the ageing population of employees with these benefits) limits the overall demand for private equity, making fundraising for LBO shops enormously challenging in an already competitive environment.

4 Common Buyout Scenarios  

  1. The Repackaging Plan - The repackaging plan is when private equity is used to purchase a currently public company. The purchased company is then taken private for a few years and "cleaned up" before being returned to the market as a fresh new IPO. 
  2. The Split-Up - Splitting up happens when a company is deemed to be worth more if divided or sold off in pieces. An LBO occurs and then the acquired company is dismantled. This is the most feared form of LBO and is commonly seen with conglomerates. 
  3. The Portfolio Plan - The portfolio plan or aggregation uses an LBO to acquire a competitor and thus enhance or add to its portfolio. This is risky because the acquired company must show a return on invested capital that exceeds the cost of acquisition. 
  4. The Savior Plan - The savior plan is often drawn up with good intentions, but frequently arrives too late. This scenario is when the management and employees of a company borrow money to save a failing company. This is the least common form of leveraged buyout because to turn a failing company around generally requires changes in management and employees.
Regardless of what they are called or how they are portrayed, LBOs will be a part of our economy as long as there are companies, potential buyers and money to lend. 


Terry Stidham is the President and Founder of Target Search Group. He is a Business Development and Deal Flow Specialist with extensive knowledge of the M&A process, combined with an in-depth understanding of the constantly changing global capital markets environment. He has served as the head of entrepreneurial organizations as well as Fortune 500 companies. He specializes with mid-market companies in a diverse array of industry sectors from service and manufacturing to technical and professional firms.

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

PE vs. Strategic Buyers

Can Private Equity Can Outmaneuver Strategic Buyers


by Terry Stidham, President of Target Search Group


When strategic buyers are flush with cash and have identified an target that they've decided is a must have, private equity firms often talk about how they don’t stand a chance. These strategic buyers, with their lower cost of debt and equity capital and their typically deep operating expertise, often can outbid even the most aggressive private equity firms.  
 
So what’s a private equity firm or independent sponsor to do when facing these deal dynamics?

Middle Market Private Equity is able to beat out strategic buyers for deals when an acquisition target meets their investment criteria.  The key advantage they are finding in negotiations is that the strategic buyers can't or aren't willing to match the flexibility and upside for the current CEO/ business owner.  

With a sale to the strategic buyer, the current CEO (who owns the entire company) will often have to sell 100% of the company and likely assumes a middle management position inside a multi-billion dollar organization.

By opting instead to work with a private equity firm,  business owners are able to accomplish a few things that are big priorities for them:
  1. Take some chips off of the table immediately
  2. Roll a bunch of equity into the capitalization table of the newly formed company
  3. Maintain the company’s independence while they shoot to take the company to the next level of scale

Contact Us to Discuss Your Sourcing Needs

If you’re in the private equity business and you’re finding yourself up against big cash-flush strategic buyers, offer the CEO a big equity opportunity (20% or more) tied to great performance in the new entity and you’ll figure out very quickly whether or not you've got a CEO who wants to go long versus sell out 100% and go home early.  If they take your offer, you've got a legitimate shot at beating out a strategic buyer at a price that still works for you and your investors.  If they don’t, then you probably didn't want to back them anyway.


Monday, June 3, 2013

Challenging M&A Evaluation Metrics

M&A Deal Evaluation

by Terry Stidham, President of Target Search Group

 
Emphasis is often placed on evaluation metrics that look as if they tell the story, but they can be misleading in the world of M&A.
 
Key questions to be answered as part of a due diligence process in determining whether or not to proceed with an acquisition include the following:
  • Is the target company a good fit?
  • How does the synergies stack up against the risks?
  • Does the target company's sector show potential for growth?
 
Can accretive earnings trump the negatives if the finding are less than encouraging? Does the fact that a deal is accretive necessarily mean that it's a good move? Conversely, are deals that dilute earnings per share (EPS) necessarily bad moves? Should EPS as a measure by which to evaluate an M&A transaction even be used?
 
Recently A.T. Kearney discussed the  findings from their research into the metrics and analyses most frequently used to evaluate proposed mergers and acquisitions. The research introduced a surprising insight: The impact on EPS is by far the most emphasized metric used to evaluate proposed M&A transactions between public companies.
 
They looked at two common and related myths surrounding EPS and demonstrated why these are at best unhelpful and at worst potentially misleading. They also examined what business leaders and market analysts should focus on instead.
 
How Do They Get It So Wrong?
"It is widely recognized that a significant percentage of M&A transactions fail to deliver value to shareholders. What goes wrong? How is it that acquisitions on average seem to create negligible returns? It can be tempting to blame poor merger integration for the meager returns, and certainly the execution of an integration can have a major impact on whether or not a transaction is regarded as successful. However, it may also be useful to consider if the deal was worth doing in the first place. Maybe some transactions should never have happened.
 
With this in mind A.T. Kearney joined forces with the UK's Investor Relations Society (IR Society) to understand exactly which metrics and analyses get the most emphasis in evaluating proposed M&A transactions. Maybe the solution to the question of "what goes wrong" lies in the tools used to filter (and one would hope eliminate) value-destroying transactions from those that create value.
 
Investor Relations professionals were surveyed to gauge the views of key stakeholders—company executives, sell-side analysts, and investors—on 10 frequently used metrics and analyses (see sidebar: M&A Metrics—Why the Difference in Emphasis?). We found that EPS analysis is used most, and by a wide margin: 75 percent of respondents ranked it in the "strong emphasis" category, fully 26 points ahead of enterprise value/EBITDA, the number two rated metric (see figure 1).
EPS accretion/dilution analysis is given the most emphasis in evaluating proposed M&A transactions
 
What Exactly Is EPS Accretion and EPS Dilution?
Before we go any further, let's define what we mean by EPS accretion and EPS dilution. A company's EPS—again, earnings per share—is simply the total profit allocated to each outstanding share.
EPS growth can be achieved either organically or inorganically through M&A activity, and few would argue that organic EPS growth is anything other than a positive indicator. EPS growth delivered through M&A activity, that is, EPS accretion, is fundamentally different. Yet there are some commonly held beliefs—or, more accurately, myths—to suggest this distinction is not fully understood by many experienced investment professionals, including some company executives.
Two myths are widely believed:
  1. EPS accretive transactions create value.
  2. EPS dilutive transactions destroy value.
As we will see, neither of these preconceptions stands up to scrutiny. Why then do so many executives and others persist in using EPS analysis to evaluate M&A transactions?
The answer comes down to views about valuation. A company's stock is frequently valued on the basis of its EPS by applying a price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio. Based on the assumption that an acquiring company's P/E ratio will stay the same after an acquisition, if earnings per share increase, then the company's overall value will increase, ostensibly as a result of the deal.
 
What's the Catch?
But, there's a catch. To understand it you need to consider the fundamentals of why one company has a higher P/E ratio than another in the first place. It is because the market believes the earnings of the company with the higher P/E ratio—call it Company A—will rise faster than those of the company with a lower P/E ratio (Company B).2 Now suppose Company A buys Company B, using its stock as the acquisition currency. As a result of the purchase the EPS of the combined company will be higher than that of Company A had it not made the acquisition—thus the transaction is EPS accretive for Company A.
But being EPS accretive comes with a downside—and that's the catch. The newly combined company will also have a lower earnings growth rate than Company A would have had as a standalone company. So while the EPS of the post-acquisition company will be higher than that of the pre-acquisition Company A, its P/E ratio will be lower due to its acquisition of the lower-P/E rated Company B.
 
In fact, the reduction in the P/E ratio, all other things being equal, will exactly counterbalance the impact of the higher EPS. The result is that the valuation of the newly combined company will reflect the blended higher EPS and lower P/E ratio of the two original companies. In other words, no value is created.
 
A key reason for doing an M&A deal is, of course, the synergies that can result. By increasing the new entity's combined earnings, synergies can add enough value to make the combined company worth more than the two individual companies were before the merger. It is important to note that the increased value results from the synergies created, not from the deal being EPS accretive or dilutive. It is quite possible that highly dilutive deals offer the greatest opportunities for delivering synergies.
An argument sometimes put forward to support the myth that EPS accretion equates to value creation is that "people believe it does." This becomes reality as the misperception is priced into the stock.
Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers write about this idea in their seminal textbook, Principles of Corporate Finance. They call it the “bootstrap game.” If companies can fool investors by buying a company with lower P/E rated stocks, then why not continue to do so? The flaw in the bootstrap game is the need to keep the market fooled, hoping it doesn’t notice that the acquiring company’s earnings growth potential is becoming progressively more diluted.
 
The inevitable result of pursuing such a strategy to its logical conclusion by continuing to acquire lower P/E rated companies is clear: In the same way a Ponzi scheme must eventually fail due to the lack of underlying value creation, the P/E multiple of the acquiring company must fall as it becomes increasingly evident to the market that no value is created.
 
What's the Alternative for Evaluating Proposed Mergers?
Our advice for evaluating a proposed merger is characteristically pragmatic: Stick to the fundamentals. M&A can deliver significant competitive advantage and value to shareholders, but the criteria by which to assess just how much must answer fundamental business questions:
  • Is the proposed merger strategically logical?
  • Will it deliver cost, revenue, or other financial synergies?
  • Will it build management or other capabilities?
  • Is the combined company capable of delivering the synergies?
A thorough, fact-based due diligence is the best way to answer these questions (see figure 2).
Transaction due diligence overview
Of course, there is also a role for using many of the M&A metrics and analyses described in figure 1 as part of an overall assessment. These can play a complementary role in developing a full perspective on a transaction. Used in isolation, however, and without a clear understanding of their limitations, they have a tendency to give a very limited view of the real potential for value creation.
Ultimately, any value an M&A transaction creates must translate into future cash flow, resulting from synergies in three value-creation areas: topline growth, operations productivity, and asset and capital investment rationalizations (see figure 3).3
Merger synergies originate from three value creation areas
And then there's the crucial question of how much to pay for a deal and who will realize the value it creates. If the net present value (NPV) of future synergies is paid to the selling shareholders in an acquisition price premium, even the most synergistic of mergers can result in value destruction for the acquirer's shareholders.5 Always consider who will be the winners in an M&A transaction—the final outcome is rarely the same for all parties.
 
EPS Myths Revisited
The moral of the story is this: Too often, too much emphasis is placed on whether a deal is EPS accretive or dilutive. These are time-honored metrics that appear sensible but in reality do not answer the most important question: Should we do the deal? Let's review the two commonly held myths and why they don't work as M&A evaluation measures.
 
EPS-accretive transactions create value. Not necessarily. Accretion is a relative measure that simply shows the company being acquired has a lower P/E rated stock.
 
EPS-dilutive transactions are value destroying. Again, not necessarily. In fact, EPS-dilutive transactions can increase value when the target company has good growth potential and the strategic logic for the deal is strong.
The fact is that EPS analysis is not a useful tool for evaluating the merits of proposed M&A transactions. Accretion or dilution is a fact of doing deals but is not a measure of potential value creation. For that, you need to examine the deal's business fundamentals.
 
Our research reveals one more insight: how the emphasis given to the different metrics and analyses has changed over the past decade. Two measures, core capabilities and cultural fit, the most qualitative among the 10 examined, are among the top measures that have "become more important" in the past decade (see figure 4). This suggests stakeholders are becoming increasingly aware of the conditions necessary for merged organizations to deliver sustained value after the deal has closed and the merger integration process begins.
How has the relative importance of each metric and analysis changed over the past 10 years?
Quick and Easy Shortcuts Can Be Misleading
This is not to say a proposed transaction's impact on EPS isn't important. It is something that needs to be understood and communicated to investors. The fact remains, however, that doing an EPS-accretive deal is easy—simply buy a company with a lower P/E rated stock than your own. So the next time someone says or implies that an M&A deal is a good one because it is EPS accretive, ask why the market gave the target company's stock a lower rating in the first place. To truly understand whether a proposed acquisition will create value requires evaluating the strategic rationale for making the deal, and if it will deliver enough synergies to create value. As with many things in life, quick and easy answers can be misleading."
 
Has your emphasis given to the different metrics and analyses changed over the past decade?